10 July 2007

Panpsychism and the challenge of unconsciousness

Most philosophies of mind agree on the division between conscious and non-conscious. Dualism postulates consciousness as soul-stuff separate from the blind matter, while various monists inspired by scientific materialism consider it to be an emergent epiphenomenon of matter/energy which is real, but once again fundamentally non-conscious. Both of these are equally unscientific views in that they have to use magic to explain the inherent paradoxes in their views. Dualism, to answer how the mind, which isn't material and cannot be detected by any material means, can yet interact with the material world. Epiphenomenalists, to explain how the non-conscious matter causes this utterly different conscious experience to emerge from it. Both of these questions may have answers, but nothing in the whole human knowledge allows us to even start formulating one. It just happens "somehow".

Functionalist views equating conscious experiences with information processing in material systems fare better in this regard, wholly avoiding the interaction problems of dualism. Note, by the way, that epiphenomenalism, no matter its monist pretensions, is still fundamentally dualist. Unlike traditional versions, it proclaims mind "unreal" and instead of two-way interaction, only matter is supposed to affect the mind. None of this changes the fact that such views divide reality into two utterly different substances. In any case, despite avoiding such problems, functionalism has some of its own. If information/matter is intrinsically conscious, how come everything isn't conscious then? Either we assume that there is some fundamental distinction between different kinds of informational processes, even if the material substrate is entirely similar and nothing that's understood about the relatively small differences offers even a slightest hint of solution to the problem. So it's the "just somehow" solution again. Or, we can go all the way to panpsychism, but not only does blathering about "how everything is conscious" sound like fluffy New Age mysticism, it also seems self-evidently absurd. If someone hits you in the head hard enough, you lose your consciousness, but it's not like all brain activity in your head stops. Besides, vast majority of that activity is always subconscious. We're aware of only a small fraction of what happens in our heads. But is this truly so, or is the idea of unconsciousness another one of those useful, yet ultimately mistaken illusions that abound in intuitive view of human mind?

I once read about an unfortunate person with considerable brain damage. He suffered from anterograde amnesia, that is, inability to form any new long-term memories. Since his working memory was intact, he could perform fairly complex tasks, have conversations and act deceptively normally, but the moment he let something go from his mind, it was gone forever. Effectively, the man was trapped in an eternal present. Occasionally he became aware that he didn't have any recollection of what had happened before, and felt that he had awakened from a long sleep, just become conscious for the first time. Once he wrote this down on a piece of paper. Moment later, he of course forgot all about it, and when he read what he had wrote, he was very puzzled. It was obvious to him that actually, it was now he was conscious for the first time, and somehow he had written about being conscious when he actually wasn't. So, he drew a line over that, and below it, wrote "NOW I am conscious for the first time!". Then he forgot it again, and was just as puzzled when he found the paper. He wound up repeating the cycle many times, and a paper filled with exclamations about finally having become conscious.

Others can safely say that the man was conscious all the time, of course. Likewise, we don't think we've been unconscious for most of our life, even if our memories cover only a small fraction of it. Others have memories of us having behaved in clearly self-aware manner during the gaps, there may be other proof our actions, and even if there isn't, we can safely assume that we were conscious years ago when awake and active, since we're conscious when we're awake now. Still, it is easy to imagine a hypothetical situation where there would be no such reasons to assume consciousness even if it actually was present. If the brain-damaged patient had been completely paralyzed as well, he would have just laid there (see this article about locked-in syndrome). If this additional damage had then been somehow repaired, the man would have risen up and said "Whoa! I just became conscious!" And this time an observer unaware of the memory impairment would have absolutely no way of telling this wasn't at all true.

I think we can safely assume that a knock-out hit disturbs brain enough to shut down memory formation and motoric functions. Therefore, if we had some conscious experiences during the time we spent crumpled on the floor, we'd have no way of communicating about them to external observers, nor any memories of those. Upon waking up, the period would simply seem an empty gap to us. Others, having perceived no indication of conscious activity, and knowing that they too had no recollections from such periods, would assume unconsciousness. None of this proves that we're actually conscious in some unstructured, primitive way during the time we seem not be. Simply that there's no way to tell.

Something similar may be happening in the case of subconscious mentation, as with the informational processes in our body outside the central nervous system (ie. the fairly complex analytic processes of human immune system). CNS isn't an unitary system; rather a network of interacting subsystems with no centre. Very little information processed by lower-order systems is relevant to the cluster of higher-order mental processes we call everyday consciousness. These deal with carefully filtered, highly abstracted information. Cortical networks directing hand to select a correct object with which to further some purpose need not be informed of status of every nerve ending any more than generals of Army High Command moving divisions need to know that Pvt Rock of 101th is homesick. If brain's subsystems are functionally differentiated, would not their associated conscious experiences be differentiated as well? Then, if explicit memory images we usually mean when referring to "memories" could in most cases only be formed by select few systems, we'd also be uncapable of recalling the other levels of conscious experience.

It's likewise with the human being and the outside world. Materially speaking, all is one. Your body and the surrounding air are composed of the same particles and quanta, occupying the same spacetime. Both are essentially empty, the face a bit less so. Still, they're also divided by a series of semipermeable boundaries. Skin, orifices, sensory organs... All designed to isolate the inside of body from the outside, while allowing in only selected kinds of matter and energy. Again, one could draw a vague parallel to the world of mind. If it is the same as the world of matter, if these two apparently dissimilar substances are actually aspects of a greater whole, then we'd expect the conscious universe to be both one and many. Brahman/Atman.

Surely, that last bit took this beyond the realms of sensibility? Hinduism is a religion, a bunch of mystical mumbo-jumbo, while philosophy and science are solidly rational endeavours. I'd expect such a reaction from many, but it betrays a feeble grasp about scientific approach to understanding the world as opposed to dogmatic following of scientific materialism. That is a metaphysical dogma that postulates that only matter and energy are real, reality consists of tiny parts and can therefore be understood by studying those parts, that mathematical laws underlie the operation of universe and so on. Now, it is a fairly sensible metaphysics as far as those go, but nonetheless, it is a philosophical dogma that requires faith should it be taken as truth. Science, on the other hand, is simply a method for formulating shared, provisional truths. It is using sense information and logic to build hypotheses about reality and then test them. It upholds no particular metaphysics, nor does reason. That most scientists are scientific materialists, that many confuse the method and dogma with each other, doesn't alter this fact at all.

Philosophy is less fortunate in the sense that it's incapable of testing its ideas. I cannot offer any experimental proof of conscious universe, even though that's where logic seems to take me. Of course, the path is dependent on disqualifying competing metaphysics for having to invoke obscure forces they cannot even begin to explain, but in the future they may find their explanations. One could say I have used Occam's Chainsaw rather than his Razor. For the moment, however, panpsychism appears to remain the simplest, clearest way of relating matter and consciousness to each other. Its sublime beauty and certain comfort I derive of it are ultimately irrelevant, of course, but a good thing nonetheless. If I have ended concurring with some ancient mystics, so be it. Perhaps they were onto something in some other ways, as well. This is not a justification for blind adoration or accepting their ideas on faith, obviously, but an exhortation for careful logical analysis freed from the confines of scientific materialism which, although often a superb tool, can also be a prison when taken as a sole truth.

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

Jätkä on tajunnu.